It is known that linear-time temporal logic (LTL), which is an extension of classical logic, is useful for expressing temporal reasoning as investigated in computer science. In this paper, two constructive and bounded versions of LTL, which are extensions of intuitionistic logic or Nelson's paraconsistent logic, are introduced as Gentzen-type sequent calculi. These logics, IB [l] and PB [l], are intended to provide a useful theoretical basis for representing not only temporal (linear-time), but also constructive, and paraconsistent (inconsistency-tolerant) reasoning. The time domain of the proposed logics is bounded by a fixed positive integer. Despite the restriction on the time domain, the logics can derive almost all the typical temporal axioms of LTL. As a merit of bounding time, faithful embeddings into intuitionistic logic and Nelson's paraconsistent logic are shown for IB [l] and PB[l], respectively. Completeness (with respect to Kripke semantics), cut-elimination, normalization (with respect to natural deduction), and decidability theorems for the newly defined logics are proved as the main results of this paper. Moreover, we present sound and complete display calculi for IB [l] Science, vol. 3210, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2004, pp. 295-309] it has been emphasized that intuitionistic linear-time logic (ILTL) admits an elegant characterization of safety and liveness properties. The system ILTL, however, has been presented only in an algebraic setting. The present paper is the first semantical and proof-theoretical study of bounded constructive linear-time temporal logics containing either intuitionistic or strong negation.
Introduction

Constructive linear-time temporal logics
It is known that linear-time temporal logic (LTL) is very useful for verifying and specifying concurrent systems [8] . Gentzentype sequent calculi for LTL and its neighbors have been introduced by many researchers. For example, a sequent calculus LT ω for LTL, which is precisely a system for Kröger's infinitary temporal logic [18] , was introduced by Kawai [17] , who proved cut-elimination and completeness theorems for this calculus. An alternative proof of the cut-elimination theorem for LT ω was given by introducing an embedding of LT ω into a sequent calculus for infinitary logic, see [15] .
In the present paper, two constructive (or intuitionistic) and bounded versions of LT ω , which have embeddings into intuitionistic logic and Nelson's paraconsistent logic rather than infinitary logic, are studied. The first one, which is an extension of intuitionistic logic, is called intuitionistic bounded linear-time temporal logic (denoted as IB [l] ), and the second one, which is an extension of Nelson's paraconsistent logic N4 [2, 21, 33] , is called paraconsistent bounded linear-time temporal logic (denoted as PB [l] ). Completeness (w.r.t. Kripke semantics), embedding, cut-elimination, normalization (w.r.t. natural deduction) and decidability theorems for IB [l] and PB [l] are proved as the main results of this paper. The logics IB [l] and PB [l] are intended to give a useful theoretical basis for adequately representing not only temporal (linear-time), but also constructive and paraconsistent (inconsistency-tolerant) reasoning.
Whereas the Hilbert-style axiom scheme for the temporal operators G (globally) and X (next): Gα ↔ (α ∧ Xα ∧ X 2 α ∧ · · · ∞), where X i α means i XX · · · X α, is characteristic of LT ω , the axiom scheme: Gα ↔ (α ∧ Xα ∧ X 2 α ∧ · · · ∧ X l α), which may be regarded as a finite approximation of the original scheme, is characteristic of the logics IB [l] and PB [l] . Then the following very informal correspondences are useful to understand these logics: Gα in LT ω corresponds to the infinite conjunction 
Why do we bound the time domain?
Although the standard LTL has an infinite (unbounded) time domain, namely the set ω of all natural numbers, the logics IB [l] and PB[l] have a bounded time domain which is restricted by a fixed positive integer l, i.e., the set ω l := {x ∈ ω | x l}.
Despite the restriction on the time domain, IB [l] and PB [l] can derive almost all the typical temporal axioms of LTL, such as a time induction axiom. As mentioned before, IB [l] and PB[l] allow us to obtain simple embeddings into intuitionistic logic and Nelson's paraconsistent logic, respectively. Using the embedding results, cut-elimination and decidability theorems for these logics can be derived. Moreover, a completeness theorem (w.r.t. Kripke semantics) and a normalization theorem (w.r.t. natural deduction) can be obtained. Such a theoretical merit may not be obtained for an unbounded and intuitionistic version of LTL, because the unbounded time domain requires some infinite inference rules. Such infinite inference rules are neither familiar to nor welcomed by researchers who study automated reasoning, since these rules cannot be implemented efficiently. Indeed, the replacement of such infinite rules of certain proof systems by finitary rules is known as an important issue.
To restrict the time domain in LTL is not a new idea. Such an idea was discussed, for instance, in [5, 7, 12] . By using and introducing a bounded time domain and the notion of bounded validity, bounded tableaux calculi (with temporal constraints) for propositional and first-order LTLs were studied by Cerrito, Mayer and Prand [7] . It is also known that to restrict the time domain is a technique that may be applied to obtain a decidable or efficient fragment of LTL [12] . Restricting the time domain implies not only some purely theoretical merits as mentioned above, but also some practical merits for describing temporal databases [7] and for implementing an efficient model checking algorithm, called bounded model checking [5] . Such practical merits are important due to the fact that there are problems in computer science and artificial intelligence where only a finite fragment of the time sequence is of interest [7] . We hope that IB [l] and PB[l] provide a good proof-theoretical basis for such practical applications as well as a good tool for automated reasoning with (bounded) linear-time formalisms.
Why do we use constructive and paraconsistent logics?
In (extensions of) standard classical propositional logic, the law of excluded middle α ∨ ¬α is valid. This means that the information represented by classical logic is complete information: every formula α is either true or not true in a model.
Representing only complete information is plausible in classical mathematics, which is a discipline handling eternal truth and falsehood. The statements of classical mathematics do not change their truth value in the course of time, and the classical mathematician may assume every situation to support either the truth or the falsity of such a statement. The assumption of complete information is, however, inadequate when it comes to representing the information available to real world agents. We wish to explore the consequences of incomplete information about computer and information systems, and then it is desirable to avail of a logic which is paracomplete in the sense of not validating the law of excluded middle [22, 37] . For representing the development of incomplete information over time, it turned out that constructive logics are useful as base logics for temporal reasoning. Indeed, constructive (intuitionistic) modal and temporal logics have been studied by several researchers, the constructive concurrent dynamic logic of Wijesekera and Nerode [37] being just one example of such logics. Particularly relevant for the present concerns is the intuitionistic linear-time temporal logic (ILTL) introduced in [19] , which is a system that can be used to express properties relating finite and infinite behaviors. In [19] , a logical characterization of safety and liveness properties is given: For every formula α, α is (expresses) an intuitionistic safety (or liveness) property iff (F⊥ → α) → α (or F⊥ → α, resp.) is valid in ILTL. Moreover, the following decomposition theorem holds:
The system ILTL, however, is presented only in an algebraic setting. The present paper is the first proof-theoretical and model-theoretical study of bounded constructive linear-time temporal logics containing either intuitionistic or strong negation. 1 We wish to handle inconsistent as well as incomplete information, since some real systems such as software systems need to ensure inconsistency-tolerance. Paraconsistent model checking based on many-valued temporal logics, for instance, which was suggested by Easterbrook and Chechik [10] , is intended to represent inconsistent information for requirements elicitation in software engineering. Whereas incomplete information calls for paracomplete logics, handling inconsistent information within a logic requires paraconsistent logics such as Nelson's N4, Dunn's and Belnap's four-valued logic, da Costa's C systems, or annotated logics. The present paper's approach is based on N4, since N4 is known as a very useful paraconsistent logic in philosophical logic, computer science, and AI (see, e.g., [22] [23] [24] [32] [33] [34] ) and because N4 is based on positive intuitionistic logic. A systematic and historical survey of paraconsistent logic can be found in [26, 27] .
The idea of combining time with paraconsistency is not a new idea. In order to express inconsistent states in temporal reasoning, annotated temporal logics * τ , which are combinations of annotated logics and LTL, were proposed by Abe and
Akama [1] . The motivation for using PB [l] in the present paper is basically the same as the motivation given in [1]. Whereas Abe and Akama's approach is only semantical, the present approach is both semantical and proof-theoretical. A general theory of combining logics has been developed, for example, in [6] .
Intuitionistic bounded linear-time temporal logic
Sequent calculus
Formulas of IB [l] are constructed from (countably many) propositional variables, ⊥ (the falsity constant), → (implication), ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction), G (globally), F (eventually) and X (next). Lower-case letters p, q, . . . are used to denote propositional variables, Greek lower-case letters α, β, . . . are used to denote formulas, and Greek capital letters Γ, , . . . are used to represent finite (possibly empty) sequences of formulas. For any ∈ {G, F, X}, the expression Γ is used to denote the sequence γ | γ ∈ Γ . The symbol ≡ is used to denote the equality of sequences of symbols. The symbol ω or N is used to represent the set of natural numbers. Let l be a fixed positive integer. The symbol ω l or N l is used to represent the set {i ∈ ω | i l}. The expression X i α for any i ∈ ω is inductively defined by (X 0 α ≡ α) and (X n+1 α ≡ X n Xα). Lower-case letters i, j and k are used to denote any natural numbers. An expression of the form Γ ⇒ where is empty or a single formula is called a sequent (for IB [l] ). An expression L S is used to denote the fact that a sequent S is provable in a sequent calculus L.
Definition 1 (IB[l]
). Let l be a fixed positive integer. In the following definition, represents the empty sequence or a single formula.
The initial sequents of IB [l] are of the following form, where p is any propositional variable:
The structural rules of IB [l] are of the form: 
It is noted that (Gright) and (Fleft) have l + 1 (i.e., a finite number of) premises. In (Gleft) and (Fright), the number k is bounded by l. Then IB[l] has the Hilbert-style axiom schemes Gα
. By (Xleft) and (Xright), the nest of the outermost occurrences of X in a formula can be bounded by l. Indeed, (Xleft) and (Xright) correspond to the Hilbert-style axiom scheme X
We may regard IB[l] as an intuitionistic and bounded version of Kawai's sequent calculus LT ω for LTL [17] . LT ω has no l-bounded rules {(Xleft) (Xright)}, and uses ω instead of ω l .
Proposition 2.
Let be the empty sequence or a single formula. The rule of the form:
Proof. By induction on proofs P of Γ ⇒ in cut-free IB [l] . We distinguish the cases according to the last inference of P .
We show some cases. Case (X i ⊥ ⇒). The last inference of P is of the form:
Case (Gleft). The last inference of P is of the form:
By induction hypothesis, we obtain: . . . .
Case (→left). The last inference of P is of the form:
Note that the rule (Xregu) is more expressive than the following standard inference rules for the normal modal logic K and KD, respectively:
where Gα ⇒ X j Gα for any j ∈ ω l can be shown in a similar way as in (5).
(7) In the following proofs, the applications of (ex) are omitted. . . . .
where α, G(α→Xα) ⇒ X k α for any k ∈ ω l is shown by mathematical induction on k as follows: the base step is obvious, and the induction step can be shown by .
. . . . 
The following definition of the embedding function f is regarded as a finite analogue of the definition of the embedding function of LT ω into infinitary logic [15] .
Definition 5.
We fix a countable nonempty set Φ of propositional variables and define the sets
and Φ 0 := Φ of propositional variables. The language L IB [l] of IB[l] is defined by using Φ, ⊥, →, ∧, ∨, X, G and F. The language L LJ of LJ is defined by using i∈ω Φ i , ⊥, →, ∧ and ∨.
A mapping f from L IB [l] to L LJ is defined by the following clause, for any i ∈ ω and any positive integer m:
The expression f (Γ ) denotes the result of replacing every occurrence of a formula α in Γ by an occurrence of f (α).
Strictly speaking, the embedding function f strongly depends on the time bound l, i.e., f should be denoted as f l .
Indeed, f 3 (Gp) and f 5 (Gp) are different. But, for the sake of brevity, we will just use f in the following.
Theorem 6 (Embedding). Let Γ be a sequence of formulas in L IB[l]
, be the empty sequence or a formula in L IB [l] , and f be the mapping defined in Definition 5.
Proof. Since (2) follows from (1), we show only (1).
(⇒) By induction on proofs P of Γ ⇒ in IB [l] . We distinguish the cases according to the last inference of P and show some cases.
. This is an initial sequent of LJ.
Case (Xleft). The last inference of P is of the form:
remarked that the case i > l is also included in this proof. In such a case, f (X
Case (Gright). The last inference of P is of the form:
We distinguish the cases according to the last inference of Q , and
show only the following case. Case (∧right LJ ). The last inference of Q is of the form:
Using this theorem, we can prove the following.
Theorem 7 (Cut-elimination). The rule (cut) is admissible in cut-free IB[l].
Proof.
Although in this paper the cut-elimination theorem for IB[l] is proved via an embedding theorem, a direct syntactical cut-elimination proof for IB[l] may be obtained using the standard way of Gentzen.
Theorem 8 (Decidability). IB[l] is decidable.
Proof. By Theorem 6, provability in IB[l] can be reduced to provability in LJ. Since LJ is decidable, IB[l] is also decidable. P
Kripke semantics
The symbols and are used to represent the linear order on ω.
Definition 9. Let l be a fixed positive integer. A Kripke frame is a structure M, N, N l , R satisfying the following conditions.
1. M is a nonempty set.
2. N is the set of natural numbers and N l := {i ∈ N | i l}.
R is a reflexive and transitive binary relation on M.
The set M can be understood as a set of information states, and the set N can be understood as a set of time points.
Definition 10.
A valuation | on a Kripke frame M, N, N l , R is a mapping from the set Ψ of all propositional variables to the power set 2
M×N of the direct product M × N such that for any p ∈ Ψ , any i ∈ N, and any
. Each valuation | is extended to a mapping from the set Φ of all formulas to 2 M×N by the following clauses:
Conditions 5 and 6 in Definition 10 are intended to express that for any positive integer m, Proof. By induction on the complexity of α. P
In the following discussion, Proposition 11 will often be used implicitly.
Note that the time-hereditary condition:
semantics. 
Theorem 13 (Soundness). Let C be the class of all Kripke frames, L
:= {Γ ⇒ | IB[l] Γ ⇒ } and L(C ) := {Γ ⇒ | Γ ⇒ is valid in all frames of C }. Then L ⊆ L(C ).
Proof. It is sufficient to show that for any sequent
This is proved by induction on proofs P of Γ ⇒ in IB [l] . To show this, we distinguish the cases according to the last inference of P . Since the proof is straightforward, we show only the following cases.
Case (Gright): The last inference of P is of the form:
In the following, we consider only the case Γ = ∅. Let | be a valuation on M, N, N l , R . By the induction hypothesis, we
. Second, we consider the case for i l as follows. This case can be shown similarly. The difference is
Thus, we obtain the required fact.
Case (Xright): The last inference of P is of the form:
We thus obtain the required
Prior to the detailed presentation of the completeness proof, we prove a Lindenbaum lemma. 
By using (cut) and some other rules, we can obtain
This contradicts the consistency of (x m , y m ).
Hence, a pair (x k , y k ) produced by the construction is consistent for any k. We thus obtain a maximal consistent pair ( 
It remains to be shown that in this model, for any formula α, any i ∈ N, and any • Case α ≡ ⊥. By the consistency of (x, w), X i ⊥ ∈ x does not hold.
• 
∈ w contradicts the consistency of (x, w), and hence X i (γ ∧ δ) / ∈ w. By the maximality of (x, w), we
•
δ ∈ w contradicts the consistency of (x, w), and hence X i γ / ∈ w or X i δ / ∈ w. Thus, we obtain X i γ ∈ x or X i δ ∈ x by the maximality of (x, w).
By the induction hypothesis, we obtain ((
∈ w contradicts the consistency of (x, w), and hence X i (γ ∨ δ) / ∈ w. By the maximality of (x, w), we obtain
• Case α ≡ Gβ.
, the fact that X i+k β ∈ w contradicts the consistency of (x, w), and hence X i+k β / ∈ w. Thus, by the maximality of (x, w), we obtain
. By the induction hypothesis, we obtain
fact that X i Gβ ∈ w contradicts the consistency of (x, w), and hence X i Gβ / ∈ w. Thus, we obtain X i Gβ ∈ x by the maximality of (x, w).
, the fact that X i β ∈ w contradicts the consistency of (x, w), and hence X i β / ∈ w. Thus, by the maximality of (x, w), we obtain X i β ∈ x. By the induction hypothesis, we obtain ((
i Gβ ∈ w contradicts the consistency of (x, w), and hence X i Gβ / ∈ w. Thus, we obtain X i Gβ ∈ x by the maximality of (x, w).
• Case α ≡ Fβ.
contradicts the consistency of (x, w), and hence ∃k ∈ N l [X i+k β / ∈ w]. By the maximality of (x, w),
Fβ ∈ w contradicts the consistency of (x, w), and hence X i Fβ / ∈ w. By the maximality of (x, w), we obtain X i Fβ ∈ x.
, the fact that X i β ∈ w contradicts the consistency of (x, w), and hence X i β / ∈ w. By the maximality of (x, w), we obtain X i β ∈ x. By the induction hypothesis, we
, the fact that X i Fβ ∈ w contradicts the consistency of (x, w), and hence X i Fβ / ∈ w. By the maximality of (x, w), we obtain X i Fβ ∈ x. P
Theorem 18 (Completeness). Let C be the class of all Kripke frames, L
Proof. In order to prove this theorem, by 
does not hold in the constructed model. Here we consider only 
The first argument is obvious because of the reflexivity of R L and the fact that {Γ } ⊆ u. The second argument is shown below. The case ≡ ∅ is obvious because is just a single formula γ ), deleting the initial sequents of the form X i ⊥ ⇒ and the structural rule (we-right), adding initial sequents X i ∼p ⇒ X i ∼p, and adding (for any k ∈ ω l ) the logical inference rules of the form:
We use the same names for the modified single-succedent inference rules.
Note that the rules (∼Xleft) and (∼Xright) imply PB[l] ∼X
i α ⇔ X i ∼α for any formula α. Also remark that the following sequents are provable in cut-free PB[l]: for any formulas α and β,
Definition 20 (LN4).
A sequent calculus LN4 for Nelson's paraconsistent logic N4 is obtained from PB[l] by deleting the inference rules (Xleft), (Xright), (∼Xleft), (∼Xright), (Gleft), (Gright), (Fleft), (Fright), (∼Gleft), (∼Gright), (∼Fleft), (∼Fright), and replacing X i by X 0 .
For more information on sequent calculi for N4, see, for instance, [24, 33] .
Definition 21.
and Φ 0 := Φ of propositional variables. The language L PB [l] of PB[l] is defined by using Φ, →, ∧, ∨, ∼, X, G and F. The language L LN4 of LN4 is defined by using i∈ω Φ i , →, ∧, ∨ and ∼.
A mapping f from L PB [l] to L LN4 is obtained from Definition 5 by replacing Condition 1 by the following condition, for any i ∈ ω: 
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 6. We show only the direction (⇒) of (1) by induction on proofs P of Γ ⇒ in PB [l] . We distinguish the cases according to the last inference of P and show some cases. Case (∼Xright). The last inference of P is of the form:
By induction hypothesis, we have LN4 f (Γ ) ⇒ f (X i ∼α), and hence obtain the required fact LN4
Case (∼∧right1). The last inference of P is of the form:
By induction hypothesis, we have LN4
) by the definition of f . P
Theorem 23 (Cut-elimination). The rule (cut) is admissible in cut-free PB[l].
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 7. P
Theorem 24 (Decidability). PB[l] is decidable.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 8. P Definition 25. Let be a negation connective. A sequent calculus L is called explosive with respect to iff for any formulas α and β, the sequent α, α ⇒ β is provable in L. It is called paraconsistent with respect to iff it is not explosive with respect to .
Proposition 26 (Paraconsistency). PB[l] is paraconsistent with respect to ∼.
Proof. Consider a sequent p, ∼p ⇒ q where p and q are distinct propositional variables. Then the unprovability of this sequent is guaranteed by using Theorem 23, i.e., we cannot construct a cut-free proof of p, ∼p ⇒ q. P
Kripke semantics
The same kind of Kripke frames which is used for IB[l] is also used for PB [l] . It is known that the Kripke semantics for logics with strong negation uses two kinds of valuations | + (representing verification) and | − (representing refutation).
For information on this type of semantics see, for example, [29, 30, 33] . Kripke models for PB[l] also use such valuations. We will write (x, i) | * p for (x, i) ∈ | * (p) where * ∈ {+, −}. The valuations | + and | − are extended to mappings from the set Φ of all formulas to 2 M×N by the following clauses: We sketch the proof of the following completeness theorem for PB [l] .
Theorem 30 (Completeness). Let C be the class of all Kripke frames, L
In order to prove L(C ) ⊆ L, almost the same arguments as those for IB[l] will be employed, i.e., the notions of consistent and maximal consistent pairs, and modifications of Lemmas 15 and 17 are used. In the following, only some particularly different points will be explained.
is defined as follows. 
Using this definition, the PB[l] version of Lemma 17 can be formalized and proved as follows.
L is a paraconsistent Kripke model such that for any formula α, any i ∈ N, and any
L is a paraconsistent Kripke model, it is shown that in this model, for any formula α, any i ∈ N, and any
This is shown by (simultaneous) induction on the complexity of α. We show only the following critical cases.
• Case α ≡ ∼β. First we show (1).
Next, we show (2). Suppose X i ∼∼β ∈ x. Since PB[l] X i ∼∼β ⇒ X i β, the fact that X i β ∈ w contradicts the consistency of (x, w), and hence X i β / ∈ w. By the maximality of (x, w), we obtain X i β ∈ x. By the induction hypothesis for (1), we obtain ((x, w) and hence ((x, w) 
and (∼Xright), the fact that X i+1 ∼β ∈ w contradicts the consistency of (x, w), and hence X i+1 ∼β / ∈ w. By the maximality of (x, w), we obtain X i+1 ∼β ∈ x. By the induction hypothesis for (2), we obtain ((x, w),
Natural deduction
This section assumes basic knowledge of Gentzen-type natural deduction systems (for detailed information, see e.g., [25, 31] ). First, we introduce a natural deduction system NPB[l] for PB [l] and show the normalization theorem for NPB [l] . Second, we discuss a natural deduction system NIB[l] for IB[l] and the normalization theorem for NIB [l] . The systems NIB [l] and NPB [l] are defined as (modified) extensions of the natural deduction system NJ for intuitionistic logic and a natural deduction system for Nelson's N4, respectively. A survey of natural deduction systems for N4 is presented in [14] . The treatment of linear time in NIB[l] and NPB[l] is adopted from [16] . In [16] , the strong normalization theorem for a typed λ-calculus for the {→, ∧, X, G}-fragment of IB[l] is shown, but the (strong) normalization theorem for the full system is not discussed. There are a lot of natural deduction systems and typed-λ-calculi for LTL and its neighbors, and a survey of such systems is also given in [3, 9, 16] . Note that our systems somewhat resemble Baratella's and Masini's system PNJ for an intuitionistic LTL which is called a logic of positions [3] .
Definition 33 (NPB[l]).
The inference rules of NPB [l] are of the following form, for any k ∈ ω l := {i ∈ ω | i l} and any positive integer m:
For the sake of simplicity, the (l + 1)-premises rule (FE) is sometimes denoted as:
The inference rules (→I ), (∧I ), (∨I1), (∨I2), (XI ), (GI ), (FI ), (∼I ), (∼→I ), (∼∧I ), (∼∨I ), (∼GI ), (∼FI ), and (∼XI ) are called introduction rules, and the inference rules (→E), (∧E1), (∧E2), (∨E), (XE), (GE), (FE), (∼E), (∼→E), (∼∧E), (∼∨E), (∼GE), (∼FE), and (∼XE) are called elimination rules. The usual terminology of major and minor premises of inference rules is used. The notions of proof (of NPB [l] ), (open and discharged) assumptions of a proof, and end-formula of a proof are defined as usual. A formula α is said to be provable in NPB[l] iff there exists a proof of NPB [l] with no open assumption whose end-formula is α. This terminology and these standard notions are from the well-known text books [25, 31] . For example, the major and minor premises of (FE) are X i Fα and β, respectively, and the discharged assumptions of (FE) are the square bracketed assumptions [X
Note that NPB[l] includes the Gentzen-type natural deduction system GN for positive intuitionistic logic. Taking 0 for i in X i , the rules of NPB[l] comprise the usual inference rules for GN. As a result, all the provable formulas (without temporal operators) in GN can be proved in NPB [l] . Thus, NPB[l] is an extension and generalization of GN.
We give an example proof in NPB[l] below, where we prove the temporal induction axiom for the case l = 1.
[
Definition 34. Let α be a formula occurring in a proof D in NPB [l] . Then α is called a maximum formula in D iff α satisfies the following conditions: (1) α is the conclusion of an introduction rule, (∨E) or (FE), and (2) α is the major premise of an elimination rule. A proof is said to be normal iff it contains no maximum formula.
In order to define a reduction relation £ on the set of proofs, we assume the usual definition of substitution of proofs (for assumptions). The set of proofs is closed under substitution.
Definition 35.
Let γ be a maximum formula in a proof which is the conclusion of an inference rule R. The reduction relation £ at γ is defined as follows.
1. R is (→I ), and γ is X i (α→β):
where n is 1 or 2.
3. R is (∨I1) or (∨I2), and γ is X i (α 1 ∨ α 2 ):
where n is 1 or 2. 4. R is (∨E):
where R is an arbitrary inference rule, and both E 1 , . . . , E l are proofs of the minor premises of R if they exist.
R is (XI )
, and γ is X l+m α:
9. R is (∼I ), and γ is X i ∼∼α:
. R is (∼→I ), and γ is X i ∼(α→β):
11. R is (∼∧I ), and γ is X i ∼(α ∧ β):
12. R is (∼∨I ), and γ is X i ∼(α ∨ β):
13. R is (∼GI ), and γ is X i ∼Gα:
. R is (∼FI ), and γ is X i ∼Fα:
. R is (∼XI ), and γ is ∼X i α: Let P be a proof. The expression oa( P ) denotes the set of open assumptions of P , and the expression end( P ) denotes the end-formula of P .
From the following theorem, we can obtain the fact that a formula α is provable in NPB[l] if and only if the sequent ⇒ α is provable in PB[l].
Theorem 37 (Equivalence between NPB[l] and PB[l]).
We have the following. Proof. First, we show (1) by induction on a proof P of PB [l] such that oa(P ) = Γ and end(P ) = {β}. We distinguish the cases according to the last inference of P . We show some cases. Case (GI ): P is of the form:
where oa(P ) = Γ and end(P ) = {X i Gα}. By the hypothesis of induction, the sequents Γ j ⇒ X i+ j α for any j ∈ ω l where Γ j is a subset of Γ are provable in PB [l] . Then the sequent Γ ⇒ X i Gα is provable in PB[l] by using (we-left) and (Gright).
Case (FE): P is of the form:
. . . .
γ γ (FE)
where oa(P ) = Γ = j∈ω l+1 Γ j and end(P ) = {γ }. By the hypothesis of induction, the following sequents are provable in
Then we obtain the required fact:
Case (∼→I ): P is of the form:
where oa(P ) = Γ and end(P ) = {X i ∼(α→γ )}. By the hypothesis of induction, the sequent Γ
Second, we prove (2) by induction on a cut-free proof P of Γ ⇒ β in PB[l]-(cut). We distinguish the cases according to the inference of P . We show some cases. Case (Gleft): P is of the form:
By the hypothesis of induction, there is a normal proof Q in NPB[l] of the form:
where oa(Q ) = Γ ∪ {X i+k α} and end(Q ) = {γ }. Then we obtain a normal proof Q as follows.
where oa( Q ) = Γ ∪ {X i Gα} and end( Q ) = {γ }.
Case (Fleft): P is of the form:
By the hypothesis of induction, there are normal proofs {Q j } j∈ω l in NPB[l] of the form: for any j ∈ ω l ,
i+ j α} and end(Q j ) = {γ }. Then we obtain a normal proof Q as follows:
where oa( Q ) = Γ ∪ {X i Fα} and end( Q ) = {γ }.
Case (∼→right): P is of the form: 
where oa(Q ) = Γ and end(Q ) = {X i ∼(α→γ )}. P is a normal proof Q such that oa(Q ) = oa(P ) and end(Q ) = end(P ).
Display calculi
A display calculus for IB[l]
In this subsection, we present a display sequent calculus δIB [l] for IB [l] . In comparison to the sequent calculus from Section 2, δIB [l] has some advantages from a philosophical point of view, see also [4, 11, 35] . In particular, if the introduction rules of a sequent calculus are viewed as meaning assignments, then the sequent calculus from Section 2 is holistic in the sense that it assigns a meaning to the operators X i only in combination with each of the other object language connectives.
By suitably generalizing the notion of a sequent and exploiting the fact that (i) ∧ and →, (ii) G and P ("sometimes in the past"), (iii) H ("always in the past") and F, and (iv) X i and E i ("i steps earlier") form residuated pairs, it is possible to state introduction rules for the connectives in such a way that every operation is introduced as the main connective of a single-antecedent (single-succedent) conclusion sequent. Moreover, the right and left introduction rules exhibit only one occurrence of the operation and no occurrence of another connective from the object language. Furthermore, the interpretation of some structural connectives in the display calculus as backward-looking temporal operators in either antecedent or succedent position allows one to add introduction rules with the just mentioned property also for the backward-looking modalities. Certain properties of the assumed temporal order such as the boundedness of the time domain can then be expressed by purely structural sequent rules not exhibiting any operations of the logical object language. In ordinary sequent calculi, the comma, ',', may be seen as a context-sensitive structural connective. It is to be understood as conjunction in antecedent position and as disjunction in succedent position of a sequent. In δIB [l] we shall use one binary operation and certain unary operations as structural connectives. A sequent is an expression of the shape ⇒ Γ , where and Γ are structures (or 'Gentzen terms'). We assume the empty structure I, and the set of structures is inductively defined (Fright):
Due to the presence of both the forward-looking and the backward-looking structural connectives, introduction rules for the backward-looking counterparts of IB[l]'s temporal operators are easily available:
A display calculus for PB[l]
A sound and complete display calculus δPB [l] for PB [l] can be obtained in a natural and straightforward way, see also the display calculi presented in [36] for extensions of Heyting-Brouwer logic by strong negation. Again, the inferential understanding of X i as laid down by the introduction rules is (basically) non-holistic. It is only the meaning of ∼ that is specified in combination with each of the other object language connectives. 
